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In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that the ‘beginning of human wisdom’ is to ‘know your 
heart’—an endeavour that is truly difficult, yet constitutive of pursuing the highest good or realising 
ourselves fully (Kant, 1996a, p. 562 [6: 441]). The highest good, in turn, ‘consists in the union and 
harmony of… human morality… and human happiness’ (Kant, 1996a, p. 282 [8: 279]). Kant 
furthermore argues that even though the highest good is ‘the whole, the complete good,’ because 
morality is ‘the supreme [unconditional] good’ while ‘happiness is something that, though always 
pleasant to the possessor of it, is not of itself absolutely and in all respects good’ (i.e. it is 
conditionally good), morality sets the framework within which happiness must be pursued (Kant, 
1996a, p. 229 [5: 110–111])). In many regards, Kant himself certainly failed in his efforts at 
becoming wise. Kant yielded to temptations to seriously dehumanise others and himself—for 
example, he was, undeniably, racist, sexist and heterosexist.i Indeed, Kant’s life shows us that it is 
possible to be a philosopher who revolutionises our thinking about morality in terms of freedom—
in fact, to be the first to propose that treating others morally is to treat them with respect or as 
having dignity—while simultaneously dehumanising himself and others. It presumably follows from 
this that we can teach our students Kant’s brilliant theories of morality as freedom without thereby 
giving them access to all the philosophical resources they need to become wise, good people. In fact, 
as we shall see below, having access to philosophical education can make us unhappy, arrogant, or 
alienated from ourselves, others and society. This paper also suggests that to remedy this problem in 
Kant’s philosophy, it helps to bring it into conversation with Hannah Arendt on the topics of 
human nature, philosophical education and wisdom within the context of modern life.ii Together, I 
propose, their theories make it easier to appreciate the emotional importance of what Kant calls our 
animality and our natural vital force, as well as how philosophical reflection and theorising are, 
paradoxically, both constitutive of becoming wiser human beings and sources of emotional 
challenges that make it more difficult to achieve wisdom. Indeed, I suggest, Kant’s own failures at 
achieving wisdom are not accidentally related to these challenges—as are those of much ideal theory 
today. 
To make my case, my first section (‘Arendt on the Human Condition and Modernity’) 
sketches Arendt’s accounts of the human condition and our modern selves. I pay special attention to 
her criticism of the Western philosophical canon’s tendency to rank human lives in a hierarchy 
where the philosopher’s contemplative life reigns supreme, and her related proposal that our 
modern selves are dangerously ungrounded. The following section (‘Kant on Human Nature’), in 
contrast, outlines Kant’s account of how practical reasoning puts us at a reflective distance from our 
natural, conscious strivings, in a way that entails that philosophical reasoning is only indirectly 
conducive to happiness. This, in turn, is why those trained in philosophy can start to hate reason and 
become envious of those less educated because they seem happier. I then sketch Kant’s accounts of 
the highest good and human nature. This enables us to see that Kant’s own deep philosophical 
commitments should have been matched by much listening and caution when engaging, let alone 
judging, various types of human lives and historical societies. Indeed, both his theories and his 
personal failures help us appreciate why the switch from ideal to non-ideal theorising must be 
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matched with a methodological switch from a top-down to a bottom-up approach. Doing so is 
necessary to stay truthful to the lives we are philosophically critiquing rather than unwittingly using 
philosophical theory to engage in dehumanising practices regarding various social groups and lives. 
This may be one reason why many deep, revolutionary philosophical thinkers who were subjected to 
dehumanising oppression and violence, including Arendt, seem to intuitively have known the 
importance of such a bottom-up approach when thinking about these complexities of their lives. I 
also propose that incorporating this approach when we teach is constitutive of providing our 
students with conditions in which they can strive to become, not only philosophically knowledgeable 
and smart, but wiser human beings. I conclude by emphasising that none of this is to say that ideal 
philosophical theorising, such as about the principles of freedom, is unimportant in education, in 
our lives or while theorising. Quite the contrary; wise human lives and theories require both 
activities: top-down ideal theory and bottom-up non-ideal theory. It is important, I argue, not to lose 
sight of the fact that modern theories of freedom—with Kant’s being an extremely powerful one—
were truly revolutionary in promoting moral progress, just as accessible, higher philosophical 
education is a gamechanger in individual lives and societies. More generally, I defend Kant’s basic 
proposal that more complete practical philosophical theories must let the ideal principles of freedom 
set the framework within which we make space for our distinctly human or historical conditions. 
 
ARENDT ON THE HUMAN CONDITION AND MODERNITY 
One intriguing proposal in Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition is that the Western philosophical 
tradition has contributed to the existence of certain problems characteristic of modern lives because 
it has tended to rank different kinds of lives in a hierarchy with the reflective, philosophical way of 
life identified as the best. To see this, I first sketch Arendt’s general account of our embodied, social, 
rational human nature before using it to show why she thinks that problems that in Ancient Greece 
were characteristic of philosophical theories, as well as the lives of philosophers, have now 
transformed in our modern world into more general problems for everyone. 
According to Arendt’s account of the human condition, we can divide our conscious activity 
into four distinct types, the first three of which—labour, work, and actioniii—constitute ‘vita activa’ 
(Arendt, 1998, pp. 7–8), while the last—philosophical contemplation—makes up ‘vita contemplativa’ 
(pp. 14–17). Labour, in turn, is defined as ‘the activity which corresponds to the biological process 
of the human body’ (p. 7). It refers to all reproductive activity that sustains us as biological 
organisms—such as cooking, cleaning, producing firewood, caring for children and the sick, etc.—
and in Ancient Greek society, this was the private activity in the home that was ideally undertaken by 
slaves (p. 7). Second, there is work, which ‘is the activity which corresponds to the unnaturalness of 
human existence’ and ‘provides an “artificial” world of things’ (p. 7). Work, then, is activity that 
creates an artificial human world by means of creating useable objects—such as buildings, tools, 
roads, bridges, etc.—that last through time. Work, therefore, is characteristically the activity of 
craftspeople (p. 7). Third, there is ‘action,’ which is ‘the only activity that goes on directly between 
men and without the intermediary of things or matter, [and it] corresponds to the human condition 
of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on Earth and inhabit the world. While all aspects of 
the human condition are somehow related to politics, this plurality is specifically the condition… of 
all political life’ (p. 7). Action is political activity in which citizens use words and speech 
spontaneously and together as free and equal—publicly—to come up with the laws and policies by 
means of which a shared, evolving political sphere is created and maintained. Action also reflects the 
fact that as a species, we are plural in that there is no one way to live life; indeed, ‘nobody is the 
same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live’ (p. 8). Hence, creating a shared political society 
together is an ongoing activity that is up for renewal and change with each new member because 
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‘each newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting’ (which 
Arendt also calls ‘natality’) (p. 9). The aim of action, so understood, is to partake in the creation of 
an immortal society, one that lasts through time and is captured by a rich history as enabled by 
artists, writers, and scholars. Finally, there is philosophical contemplation, which goes beyond the 
human condition altogether, including action, in how it aims at truth: ‘Every movement, the 
movement of body and soul as well as of speech and reasoning, must cease before truth. Truth, be it 
the ancient truth of Being or the Christian truth of the living God, can reveal itself only in complete 
human stillness’ (p. 15). Philosophical contemplation is, in other words, pure rational activity 
directed towards uncovering eternal universal truths—truths of the universe—which are only 
available insofar as we do not engage in human labour, work or action, but are completely still. 
To illustrate these ideas, consider Arendt’s example of the USSR’s launching of the satellite 
Sputnik into orbit around our planet in 1957. If we use the above concepts to describe this event, we 
can say that it could not have happened unless there had been: much labour spent on keeping all the 
people involved in it sufficiently safe and healthy (fed, rested, clothed, etc.); much work spent on 
producing all the physical objects—the shell, the engine, the instruments, etc.—constituting the 
satellite as well as all the other world-constituting objects needed for this project to succeed; much 
action in USSR politics that involved envisioning and politically organising the institutional efforts 
making this launch possible; and, finally, much philosophical contemplation in the sense of various 
philosophical discoveries throughout the centuries as well as much scientific thought that was 
fundamentally enabled by this philosophical contemplation. All this activity made it possible to find 
a way to make a human-made object leave planet Earth and move in an orbit around the planet. 
This achievement was, in Arendt’s view, ‘second in importance to no other,’ not only because it 
required such incredible human accomplishments, but because it involved directly engaging the 
universe beyond our planet by scientific means for the first time (p. 1). Setting aside the political 
drama of the event—it happened in the middle of the Cold War—Arendt proposes that the event 
was philosophically so important also because of the way in which so many people, across nations, 
spontaneously responded to it. The predominant response was similar to the one expressed on the 
graveside obelisk of one of the great Russian scientists, namely that ‘Mankind will not remain bound 
to the earth forever’ (p. 1). The philosophical puzzle, Arendt argues—and then posits as a main 
topic to be explored in The Human Condition—is that instead of finding it amazing that we now can 
engage in the universe in this way, many expressed existential relief that perhaps we can leave this 
planet soon. How can we explain that human beings who reside on an incredible, utterly stunning 
planet experience earthly life as analogous to being imprisoned and hence spontaneously express 
such a deep longing to leave it behind? 
 Arendt’s answer to this question of modern human alienation from our earthly selves is 
complex. To start, she suggests that even though the various accounts of human nature on offer in 
the Western philosophical tradition differ in how they construe our more animalistic, social and 
rational parts, they are commonly arranged in a hierarchy where the rational parts—the ones realised 
most fully by philosophers—reign at the top. Moreover, she proposes that one source of the 
convictions that philosophers have the best lives and have the best judgment of all moral matters, 
including of the functioning of our public institutions (indeed, for Plato, that philosophers should be 
in charge of society as ‘philosopher kings’), is the belief that they experience the highest or best—the 
most divine—type of pleasure there is for humans. Philosophers obtain this type of pleasure by 
engaging in philosophical contemplation, which involves experiencing a ‘kind of death’ (p. 20). This 
small death refers to how, while being submerged in philosophical contemplation, we subjectively 
experience the absence of our earthly human selves. That is to say, the activity of philosophical 
contemplation is one in which we no longer have a subjective sense of our own body or of our own 
self (the reflectively self-conscious ‘I’) even though contemplating philosophical truths—or leaving 
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the cave behind, to say it with Socrates and Plato—is an activity we can do on our own or together 
with others, the moments of grasping truths (‘getting it’) is something we can only do ‘singularly’ (on 
our own) (p. 20). Hence, when we employ our rational powers in philosophical contemplation, we 
experience a small death that, paradoxically and incredibly, can get us to eternal truths of the 
universe. 
To illustrate this point of Arendt’s further, remember how Aristotle in his Book 10 of the 
Nicomachean Ethics proposes that pure philosophical contemplation is the most divine experience 
possible for humans because it enables the highest—the most ‘pleasant,’ ‘pure,’ ‘stable,’ ‘self-
sustainable,’ and ‘self-sufficient’—form of pleasure there is for us (see Aristotle, 2000, pp. 194–199 
[1177a–1179a]). To clarify Aristotle’s argument, we can draw on the French expression that orgasm 
is ‘le petit mort.’ An orgasm, in other words, also involves a momentary loss of both our sense of our 
own embodiment and the reflective sense of ‘I’ (reflective self-consciousness), and it is something 
we can only experience singularly. Moreover, although only I can experience my own orgasm, I can 
pursue it on my own or together with others.iv Aristotle’s proposal is that philosophical 
contemplation is of a higher quality—‘une mort un peu plus grande’—than an orgasm even though they 
are both, we can say with Arendt, experiences of small deaths.v In addition, remember that when we 
engage in philosophical contemplation, we can subjectively experience truths of the universe and not 
our own or earthly living (p. 20). It is not so strange therefore that once philosophy starts in a 
society, those engaged in it can easily become spellbound by its pleasures. Because philosophical 
contemplation opens up human life and reality in new ways, is not restricted to life on the planet, 
and involves a distinctive kind of deep pleasure, it becomes easy for philosophers (and others) to 
conclude that the different parts of our lives can be organised in a hierarchy, with the more 
biological or animalistic parts—the ones we share with other earthly biological beings (plants and 
animals)—being located at the bottom, while the social and cultural ones are found at the next, 
higher level, before, finally, the rational and philosophical parts reign at the top. 
 Arendt does not doubt ‘the validity of the experience’ underlying the distinction between 
vita activa (labour, work, and action) and vita contemplativa (philosophical contemplation) (p. 18). 
Rather, she challenges ‘the hierarchical order inherent in it from its inception’ in Ancient Greek 
philosophy (p. 17). She argues that it is a mistake to organise these different aspects of our lives into 
a hierarchy with the explicit or implicit aim of ridding ourselves of the ‘lower’ parts, and maybe vita 
activa altogether, by making it a ‘handmaiden’ for philosophical contemplation (p. 21). Arendt 
furthermore thinks that these hierarchical tendencies in Ancient Greek (and most subsequent) 
philosophy, according to which vita activa and vita contemplativa are viewed as distinctive activities 
where the latter should rule the former, were helped along by the fall of the Roman Empire (which 
crushed the notion that humans can create immortal societies) and Christianity (with its notion of an 
everlasting individual): ‘Both together made any striving for an earthly immortality futile and 
unnecessary’ (p. 21). 
Turning to modernity, Arendt proposes that the scientific revolution together with various 
important modern liberatory movements undertaken in the name of equality, such as the labour and 
women’s rights movements, freed much of human life from being bound to or enslaved by 
reproductive needs. Arendt’s view is not that we should glorify or romanticise labour. After all, 
doing only labour is emotionally draining for us because it is so centrally focused on sheer 
reproductive activities—a concern that feminist philosophy characteristically has given voice to 
(since women typically have had to do much of the labour in lower social classes or in societies 
where slavery was illegal). Nevertheless, Arendt emphasises that a tempting, yet mistaken inference 
one can draw is that labour does not have any value at all. Labour, Arendt proposes instead, is an 
emotionally grounding activity constitutive of our private sphere—of the ‘hearth’ in the home. It is 
emotionally grounding because it makes us engage in activity tuned into the cyclical biological 
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processes constitutive of all, including human, organic life on the planet. In pre-modern times, our 
vulnerabilities in relation to sickness, weather, the seasons, etc., entailed that human life itself 
regularly drew everyone back to this cyclical activity, while in modernity, this no longer happens 
because of the ways in which modern science (including medicine) and societal organisation make it 
possible for many (and not just the elite) to spend much less time on labour. Yet, consequentially, 
we have become importantly ungrounded emotionally; we no longer emotionally integrate our 
animalistic, earthly being in good, sustaining ways. 
Importantly, Arendt does not think that the problem we are inheriting is simply that 
philosophers have tended to put human lives into a hierarchy and then declared philosophical 
contemplation the best life. In addition, she argues that ‘the enormous weight of contemplation in 
the traditional hierarchy has blurred the distinctions and articulations within the vita activa itself… [a] 
condition [that] has not changed essentially by the modern break with the tradition and the eventual 
reversal of its hierarchical order in Marx and Nietzsche… the conceptual framework is left more or 
less intact’ (p. 17). Starting with the last point, Arendt argues that even if we re-arrange the 
traditional hierarchy and, with, say, Marx, put (his conception of) labour at the top, the fundamental 
mistake is still there in that the various kinds of valuing activity are organised in a hierarchy. 
Moreover, and this brings us to the first point, Marx also has a fuzzy view of the distinctions within 
vita activa (between labour, work, and action), which is why his overall analysis yields an insufficiently 
complex account of these aspects of our being. Let us slow down a little to clarify both points. 
Our loss of a sense of the importance of labour is, Arendt proposes, accompanied by a 
meshing into one of all the distinctive valuing activities—labour, work, action, and contemplation. 
Whether we think of labour theories such as those of Karl Marx, Adam Smith, or John Locke or just 
modern common sense, all value-creating activity is typically thought of as only one kind, for which 
we use the words ‘labour’ or ‘work’ interchangeably. Hence, whether we are bus drivers or 
mechanics, shopkeepers or farmers, monarchs or prime ministers, schoolteachers or professional 
philosophers, we are all just doing a job for which we get paid, and our doing it well is measured by 
how much money we make or how much—how many objects—we ‘produce.’ Although many 
languages and old phrases, such as Locke’s famous phrase ‘the labour of my body, and the work of 
my hands’ tracks the distinction between labour and work, there is no theoretical or common 
awareness of different types of activities and objects involved in the two kinds of activities (pp. 
103f.). This, in turn, is related to how the judgement about whether we are, say, successful as 
philosophers, is centrally connected to how many students we teach or how many papers we publish 
(rather than the quality of the teaching or the research). Similarly, whether we do well as a society 
depends on how many objects we produce or sell—this will improve our annual reports, increase 
our profits, raise the GDP, etc.—rather than on whether the objects produced are of a kind suited 
to the activity in which they are used and whether they enable flourishing and sustainable life on the 
planet. For example, because we have lost the distinction between labour and work, we now use 
plastic objects as part of our carry-out meals and call them ‘disposable’ even though a plastic object 
really is not disposable. A plastic object is an object of work and not labour. This is not to say that 
plastic is a bad product—it is an amazing product—but it is an object of work and not labour, which 
is why it cannot be treated as, say, a ‘disposable’ part of a carry-out meal. Objects of labour are 
cyclical (as they track biological processes of sustainable reproduction), while objects of work are 
linear (as they are constitutive of efforts to create an artificial world that lasts through time). Hence, 
tools like a cup, a plate, cutlery, or a pot (objects of work) should, as a general rule, be used 
repeatedly as part of the production of many meals (objects of labour). When we need artifacts that 
will only be used once, such as if we suddenly need to improvise when hiking in the mountains or 
for the purpose of carry-out meals, then we must make sure these artifacts are truly disposable, such 
as by using branches of trees as cooking tools when hiking or recyclable containers for carry-out 
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meals. Hence, our loss of distinction between labour and work is one reason why we face the 
enormous environmental problems we do currently on the planet as well as the problem of 
consumerism characteristic of our societies. Moreover, whether we put ‘contemplation’ or (Marx’s 
notion of) ‘labor’ at the top, Arendt suggests, the fundamental problems are that we have lost a 
sense of different kinds of value and that we mistakenly strive to organize all valuing activity into 
such hierarchies.  
 
KANT ON HUMAN NATURE  
Kant’s philosophy uncontroversially avoids some of the problems Arendt views as characteristic of 
the Western philosophical tradition. Kant and philosophers following his lead characteristically put 
our human capacity for autonomy at the centre of their analyses of ethics (virtuous internal freedom) 
and right (rightful external freedom). Kantian analyses of virtue correspondingly tend to focus on 
Kant’s proposals regarding the moral law, the categorical imperative, perfect and imperfect duties, 
and acting from duty, while Kantian analyses of right characteristically focus on Kant’s account of 
the ‘Doctrine of Right’ with its accounts of the Universal Principle of Right, of innate, private, and 
public right. Both kinds of Kantian analysis—of virtue and of right—are deeply consistent with 
Arendt’s central claims that human beings are irreducibly different from one another, that there is 
no hierarchy of value characteristic of different types of life (the life of the philosopher is not more 
valuable than the life of the soccer player), and that philosophers do not have the best judgments of 
our public institutions and certainly should not oversee or govern the rest of humanity as 
philosopher kings. Before turning to the ways in which Kant or the Kantian philosophical tradition 
nonetheless have important lessons to learn from Arendt—even though, in my view, the 
multifaceted systematicity of Kant’s philosophical position is better than Arendt’s—let me show 
how Kant adds to Arendt’s analysis of the dangers of doing philosophy. 
Although it is not widely known, Kant argues that learning to reason philosophically and, 
indeed, living a philosopher’s life, is an activity that comes with the destructive temptations to start 
hating reason and become envious of those who do not put philosophical reasoning at the core of 
their lives. This is not to say that Kant thinks we shouldn’t do practical philosophy or that there are 
no good reasons why human beings start doing it; in fact, Kant thinks we start doing practical 
philosophy because we often find ourselves in trouble in life (when living without it). He argues that 
even though ‘[t]here is something splendid about innocence… what is bad about it… is that it 
cannot protect itself very well and is easily seduced’ (Kant, 1996a, pp. 58–60 [4: 404–5]). So, we start 
doing philosophy in part to overcome the troubles characteristic of innocent lives, but, Kant 
continues, some of the perplexity of learning to reason philosophically does not actually make us 
happier as such. In fact, because of its inherently reflective and abstract conceptual nature (more on 
this below), reasoning puts us at a distance from, rather than closer to happiness. Kant argues that 
 
the more a cultivated reason purposely occupies itself with the enjoyment of life and with 
happiness, so much the further does one get away from true satisfaction; and from there 
arises in many, and indeed in those who have experimented most with this use of reason, if 
only they are candid enough to admit it, a certain degree of misology, that is, hatred of reason; 
for, after calculating all the advantages they draw… they find that they have in fact only 
brought more trouble upon themselves instead of gaining in happiness; and because of this 
they finally envy rather than despise the common run of people, who are closer to the 
guidance of mere natural instinct and do not allow their reason much influence on their 




In addition to this problem of hating reason and being envious of those who live happier lives 
without it, there is the problem that being unhappy but good at philosophical reasoning makes us 
liable to arrogance. If we yield to this temptation—something which, as Arendt points out, seems to 
have been the case for Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle—then we are likely to despise or look down 
upon those who are happy even though they are not as philosophically reflective. Both the envious 
and the arrogant philosopher reveal, in other words, emotional challenges that come with learning to 
reason philosophically. 
There is no quick fix to these challenges of life: we need philosophy to become wiser, but 
doing philosophy sets us further apart from happiness, while, contrarily, pursuing happiness without 
philosophy (innocence) makes us liable to lose our way easily and become very seducible. To put 
this point from a different direction, we may say that although wise persons know and protect what 
makes them happy, they also recognise and value what philosophy has to offer. Kant relatedly argues 
that because doing what is right—exercising moral responsibility—often makes reason-based claims 
on us that go against our ‘needs and inclinations’ (happiness) and they do so ‘unremittingly,’ and 
‘without thereby promising anything to inclinations[,]… there arises a natural dialectic… a propensity 
to rationalise against those strict laws of duty and to cast doubt upon their validity… or… purity and 
strictness… to make them better suited to our wishes and inclinations’ (Kant, 1996a, pp. 59–60 [4: 
405]). Because of this danger, wisdom—‘which… consists more in conduct than in knowledge’—
needs philosophy’s help by ‘provid[ing] access and durability for its precepts’ (Kant, 1996a, p. 59 [4: 
405]). More specifically, the systematicity of philosophy provides  
 
information and distinct instruction regarding the source of its [common human reason’s] 
principle and the correct determination of this principle in comparison with maxims based on 
need and inclination so that it may escape from its predicament about claims from both sides 
and not run the risk of being deprived of all genuine moral principles through the ambiguity 
into which it easily falls. (Kant, 1996a, p. 60 [4: 405])  
 
The wise person therefore needs and wants what practical philosophy has to offer because 
philosophy has a type of systematicity—a thoroughly thought-through system of concepts or 
principles by means of which to distinguish and analyse parts of our realities and lives—that helps us 
think clearly about the complex and complicated situations we may find ourselves in. This, in turn, 
also makes it easier to persevere in doing what is right when we don’t feel like it and so helps us 
become more careful as we think through how to do things better. 
Doing practical philosophy—even at the highest, most advanced levels—is therefore 
insufficient for pursuing the highest good well or living wisely. As we noted in the introduction, on 
this account, the highest good is to strive to bring happiness and morality into as harmonious a 
union as possible (Kant, 1996a, p. 282 [8: 279], p. 229 [5: 110–111]). Hence, Kant views himself as 
disagreeing with both the Epicureans and the Stoics: ‘The Epicurean said: to be conscious of one’s 
maxim leading to happiness is virtue; the Stoic said: to be conscious of one’s virtue is happiness. For 
the first, prudence was equivalent to morality; for the second, who chose a higher designation for 
virtue, morality alone was true wisdom’ (Kant, 1996a, p. 229 [5: 111]). Kant argues instead that wisdom 
requires us to know both happiness and morality. Moreover, because what is prudent is conditional 
(maxims relative to the person and situation) while morality is unconditional (objective principles 
obliging all rational beings), our aim—what the wise person does—is to strive intentionally to 
deserve to be happy by pursuing happiness within the framework set by morality, or within a 
framework set by a genuine commitment to treating all persons as having dignity. Notice too, 
though, that Kant-interpretations, according to which the best version of the highest good is the life 
of the sage, incur another version of Arendt’s objection to the Western philosophical tradition. After 
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all, on these interpretations, we should strive always and only to do what is right because it is right, 
and insofar as we are successful at realising this ideal, we do so with joy, in which case the reflective 
life of the sage becomes better than the lives of those who also pursue a conception of the good that 
integrates an earthly (embodied, social) conception of happiness. These accounts therefore invoke a 
new type of hierarchy: the best life becomes the as-purely-rational-life as possible (the moral life of 
the sage), while the lesser lives become lives that are also earth-bound—and Arendt’s objection re-
instantiates. On these accounts, our animalistic, affectionately social being—what Arendt puts into 
‘labour’ and what Kant, as we will see below, puts into ‘animality’—becomes something without a 
distinctive, important value in a rich human life, and, so, giving it up is not seen as giving up 
something valuable; indeed, giving it up by living the non-earthly or (purely) moral life of the sage is 
viewed as the ideal.vi 
Regardless of these disagreements over the sage, note that we are now not surprised by 
Kant’s claim that we must make truthfulness our most basic duty, that truthfulness is the only 
‘sacred command of reason’ (Kant, 1996a, p. 613 [8: 427]). Truthfulness is constitutive of knowing 
what we are doing (which maxims we are acting on) and daring to learn what makes us truly happy. 
Without truthfulness, happiness and morality are beyond reach, let alone the project of pursuing 
happiness within the framework of morality—which is what the person with character or integrity 
does. Kant therefore says that 
 
the only proof within a human being’s consciousness that he has character is that he has 
made truthfulness his supreme maxim, in the heart of his confessions to himself as well as in 
his behavior toward everyone else; and since to have this is the minimum that one can 
demand of a reasonable human being, but at the same time also the maximum of inner 
worth (of human dignity), then to be a man of principles (to have a determinate character) 
must be possible for the most common reason and yet, according to its dignity, be superior 
to the greatest talent (Kant, 2007, p. 393 [7: 295]). 
 
Living life with character or integrity is, in other words, something everyone can do—indeed 
philosophers are not more likely to be able to do this than other people—but doing so is impossible 
without truthfulness.vii Moreover, although doing philosophy brilliantly can bring us much well-
deserved fame and admiration, we admire it less morally than we admire a person with integrity. 
Kant’s philosophical brilliance bows, in other words, to the moral integrity of Sojourner Truth. 
The challenge of wisdom, then, comes with learning to be truthful—to describe correctly 
what you do, including what motivates you to do what you do. Hence Kant relatedly proposes that 
you have a moral duty to 
 
‘know (scrutinize, fathom) yourself,’… in terms of your moral perfection in relation to your 
duty. That is, know your heart—whether it is good or evil, whether the source of your 
actions is pure or impure, and what can be imputed to you as belonging originally to the 
substance of a human being or as derived (acquired or developed) and belonging to your 
moral condition. 
Moral cognition of oneself, which seeks to penetrate into the depths (the abyss) of 
one’s heart which are quite difficult to fathom, is the beginning of all human wisdom. For in 
the case of a human being, the ultimate wisdom, which consists in the harmony of a being’s 
will with its final end, requires themviii to remove the obstacle within (an evil will actually 
present in [them]) and then to develop the original predisposition to a good will within 
[them], which can never be lost. (Only the descent into the hell of self-cognition can pave 
the way to godliness)… This moral cognition of oneself will, first, dispel fanatical contempt 
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for oneself as a human being (for the whole human race), since this contradicts itself… But 
such cognition will also counteract that egoistical self-esteem which takes mere wishes… for 
proof of a good heart. (Kant, 1996a, pp. 562–3 [6: 441]) 
 
Learning to describe oneself truthfully is not, then, an exercise in having contempt for everything 
distinctly human rather than merely rational. Rather, it is to learn what we like to do, what kinds of 
patterns of motivation—good, bad, and neutral—we are liable to have, and it is to learn to trust that 
the predisposition to good (more on this below) really is good. If we engage in our lives in this way, 
we can realise happiness in union with morality—the basic ends we set will not be at war with 
morality—and we can do so in a way that we can morally own and that makes us happy. Of course, 
whether we end up being happy is beyond our control—there are too many accidents, including 
others’ behaviours and lives, affecting this. But striving to deserve to be happy is a project that 
makes fundamental sense to beings like us, and it is the only one for which we can assume moral 
responsibility.ix 
Even if one agrees with everything above as a matter of Kant-interpretation and sets aside 
possible disagreement regarding the Kantian sage, other aspects of Kant’s practical philosophy still 
call out for critical engagement, correction and development. In particular, Kant’s answer (and 
typical Kantian answers) to the question of how to make his theories of freedom (of virtue and of 
right) applicable to human nature generally, as well as to particular historical lives and societies, 
require serious rethinking. After all, Kant’s own way of doing this often merely reproduces his own 
prejudices, while thinkers in the Kantian tradition tend to follow suit or never get the historical 
problems we are inheriting properly into view. To make this argument below, I first develop the 
methodological approach started in previous work,x namely that when we switch from ideal theory 
(identifying objective principles of freedom) to focusing on the human condition and/or historical 
lives and societies, we must increasingly switch to a bottom-up, rather than top-down, investigative 
approach that requires careful listening and attention to the human lives in question. As we do, we 
can, however, still hold onto Kant’s basic philosophical distinctions as captured by his 
‘predisposition to the good’ (‘animality’, ‘humanity’, ‘personality’), his ‘propensity to evil’ (‘frailty’, 
‘impurity’, ‘depravity’), as well as his basic ideas regarding how we develop, integrate, and transform 
ourselves by means of associative, abstract conceptual, and aesthetic-teleological thought. His 
philosophical systematicity remains extremely useful—indeed better than Arendt’s—but in order to 
end up with wiser, more complete philosophical theories than Kant himself did and Kantians often 
do, it is crucial to listen carefully to, and strive to understand, the human lives and historical societies 
we are trying to critique with our theories. Then we—personally, as students, as thinkers—can figure 
out how to let the objective principles of freedom (the principles of virtue and of right) set the 
framework within which we can reform our inherited, partly dysfunctional institutions and pursue 
happiness individually or as a society. Let me explain, starting with a very brief sketch of the 
predisposition to good and the propensity to evil.xi 
 
2.1 Kant’s Predisposition to Good and Propensity to Evil in Human Nature  
Kant’s writings on anthropology, history, education, and religion have received increased attention 
recently, and with it, his three-fold accounts of both our embodied, social, rational nature and our 
ineliminable tendency to do bad things. On the latter point, in the Religion, Kant proposes that the 
predisposition to good in human nature consists of our reflexive and reflective self-conscious 
strivings to ‘animality,’ ‘humanity,’ and ‘personality,’ and that the propensity to evil comes in three 
degrees, namely ‘frailty,’ ‘impurity,’ and ‘depravity.’xii As the related secondary literature is growing, it 
is unsurprising that we find a re-instantiation of many classical interpretive and philosophical 
debates, such as how to understand Kant’s philosophical position as one of ‘transcendental idealism’ 
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(rather than, simply, a rationalistic or empirical account)—and, so, also with debates regarding how 
to understand our cognitive abilities in relation to our animality.xiii Here I do not engage these 
debates, but merely show why I believe that to take on Arendt’s challenges to the philosophical 
tradition, to appreciate core challenges regarding wisdom, (philosophical) education and moral 
improvement, and to appreciate the systematic strength of Kant’s position relative to that of Arendt, 
it is philosophically important to view our animality as irreducibly reflexively self-conscious in nature 
and as working together with our natural vital force.xiv On this basis, we can then appreciate how 
living well requires us to develop, transform and integrate our animality with our humanity and 
personality and to do so by means of our associative, abstract conceptual, and teleological-aesthetic 
cognitive powers. Because I provide a fuller engagement with Kant’s accounts of the predisposition 
to good and the propensity to evil elsewhere,xv here I merely sketch a few, core features that are 
particularly important for our current purposes. 
Kant thinks that we have a three-fold nature consisting of ‘animality,’ ‘humanity,’ and 
‘personality.’ Our animality (or what makes us ‘living beings’) is constituted by three reflexively self-
conscious drives—to preserve ourselves, to have sex, and to develop affectionate community—that 
are fundamentally grounded in our natural ‘vital force’ (our embodied forcefulness). Each 
predisposition, in turn, is enabled by a relational category of the understanding—namely substance 
(self-preservation), causality (sex drive), and community (affectionate community)—which must 
here be understood teleologically, namely as orienting a new-born’s ability to act in accordance with 
pleasures and pains such that the baby becomes a good and harmonious forceful whole. In other 
words, new-born babies strive to stay alive by sucking until they are full, and they find it pleasant to 
be touched gently and held affectionately. Their natural vital force is strong and good when these 
activities are organised by their caregivers in a teleological whole; in these cases, the cyclical 
combination between eating, rest, and affection results in an overall harmonious baby. That this is a 
reflexively self-conscious striving is seen exactly by how it is present in new-born babies’ behaviours: 
babies cannot yet reason—they cannot use abstract concepts—in a reflectively self-conscious way 
(as an “I”). In addition, we see that this account of our animality is plausible because it helps us 
explain other animals’ behaviour, too—and, indeed, we develop our animality in part through 
associative thinking like they do.xvi 
In contrast to all other animal new-borns, however, human beings scream when they are 
born. To explain this philosophically, Kant proposes that we need to attribute an additional capacity 
for representation to human babies, namely that they scream to express frustration at their inability 
to act (Kant, 2007, p. 369 [7: 268]). It is this capacity for freedom that in time becomes transformed 
into the actual ability to act, in the sense of setting ends of one’s own. In addition, it doesn’t take 
many weeks before human babies start to smile and cry in a way that reveals a nascent ability to 
relate to an image of themselves, as seen by others. It is pleasant to be seen by loving caregivers and 
it is pleasant to see them, just as not being seen by or not seeing them is, at first, experienced as 
unpleasant. These two kinds of representation—of freedom and of a social sense of self—constitute 
the second predisposition to good in human nature, to humanity (or what makes us ‘rational’ 
beings). Developing this predisposition is a slow process because of its cognitive and emotional 
complexity. In particular, developing our ability to set ends of our own (to act on maxims) and to 
learn to manage our social sense of self requires us to develop reflective self-consciousness (to 
become able to use the self-reflective ‘I’) as well as our abstract conceptual, associative, and 
aesthetic-teleological powers. For example, we must learn to master bodily movement and different 
kinds of social presentation, to use abstract concepts—apple, milk, table—to describe objects in the 
world, to appreciate which objects can be made into larger, more complex objects, to appreciate 
what we like and do not like, to associate various objects with dangers, to play, to reason, to 
appreciate beauty, and so on. All of this takes years for us to develop, from initial reaching towards 
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objects in the crib to being able to set and pursue ends of our own, ends we want to pursue, and to 
do so well. 
Finally—and this brings us to the third predisposition, to personality (or what makes us 
morally ‘responsible’ beings)—we must learn to act as motivated by our practical reason. We must 
become able to do something just because it is the right thing to do and to abstain from doing 
something just because it is wrong—and we must become able to do this even though we would like 
to do otherwise. In technical Kantian terms, we must become able to abstain from action if the 
maxim we want to act on is not universalisable, meaning that the end we would like to pursue is 
incompatible with treating ourselves or others with respect (as having dignity), and we must strive to 
create a world in which we flourish and where we assist others in their efforts to do the same. 
Developing moral character (personality) is therefore only possible because of our capacities for 
practical reason. It is revealed in or accompanied by ‘moral feeling,’ in our capacity for feeling the 
moral ‘ought’ or feeling bound by moral duty. Correspondingly, our moral aim is to develop a strong 
ability to act in these ways, which is to develop a strong moral vital force. Hence, if we return to the 
highest good, we can say that our aim in life is to develop our natural and our moral vital forces into 
as harmonious a whole as possible and with our moral vital force being strongest. If we succeed, 
then our moral vital force is experienced as, or feels like a precondition for, acting in the pursuit of 
particular ends that make us happy (perfect duties) and, insofar as life allows, as making it necessary 
for us to work towards a better future for humankind by developing our own talents and capacities 
and by assisting others in their pursuit of happiness (imperfect duties).xvii 
 Kant’s theory of human nature also contains an account of our propensity to evil.xviii In 
short, in my preferred interpretation, evil is something we bring upon ourselves through our capacity 
for choice (setting ends of our own) and it comes in three degrees: ‘frailty,’ ‘impurity,’ and 
‘depravity.’ Moreover, what distinguishes the degrees tracks how we can lose our way in life in 
increasingly more complex ways. Hence, frailty refers to an instance of wrongdoing, impurity to an 
emotionally unstable pattern of motivations determining our actions, and depravity to a striving to 
weaken our subjective susceptivity to act morally. Hence, a depraved heart always involves adopting 
‘evil maxims’ and ‘reversing the ethical order as regards the incentives of a free power of choice’ in a 
self-deceptive manner (since humans do not have a ‘diabolical’ will) (Kant, 1996b, p. 78 [6: 30]). A 
depraved heart, in other words, always involves acting on a non-moral motivation in a self-deceived 
manner or doing something bad in the name of doing something good. In contrast, frailty and 
impurity can be done either self-deceptively or non-deceptively, though if we do so self-deceptively, 
it is more difficult to improve our ways. So, for example, a male colleague in a philosophy 
department may interrupt his woman colleague just that once because he was having a truly horrible 
time in life and, somehow, this incident is just an outlet for his current inability to manage—and he 
might do it self-deceptively (saying things like ‘it’s not my fault; life is too hard and she was really 
annoying’) or not self-deceptively, but affectively (saying things afterwards like ‘I can’t believe that I 
just did that! What a terrible thing I just did!’). This is frailty. Or how he treats his woman colleague 
always depends on how he’s feeling that day: on good days, he doesn’t interrupt, while on bad days, 
he does—and he might do it without self-deception (he acknowledges that he has a problem with 
interacting professionally with women) or with self-deception (he tells himself a story, according to 
which this (or these) colleague(s) deserve(s) to be treated in this way). This is impurity. Finally, he 
might never orientate himself around women respectfully, but to what extent he behaves 
professionally depends on what makes him feel better about himself in the moment. In situations 
where he wants to put a woman ‘in her place,’ he does that; in situations where he wants to show 
how committed he is to diversity to impress others, he acts accordingly. Generally, however, any 
actions of women that appear to affirm themselves as this male colleague’s equal (rather than 
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someone who fundamentally adores him as a subordinate, an unequal) will, potentially, incur his 
wrath: how dare she?! This is depravity. 
 In Kant’s practical philosophy, this account of human nature complements his accounts of 
moral freedom (of virtue and of right), of the highest good, and of wisdom. Before turning to the 
places where Kant fails at writing wisely, where he engages in dehumanisation by means of 
philosophy), notice that there are several advantages to his overall theory as compared to Arendt’s. 
A full comparison and analysis is impossible within the context of this paper, but let me sketch some 
of these points to indicate why my overall suggestion throughout this paper is that combining and 
transforming their various proposals may be the most productive approach. To start, using Kant’s 
‘animality’ rather than Arendt’s ‘labour’ to capture our animalistic (embodied, social) nature clearly 
seems philosophically advantageous. Kant’s account is better in that his use of the natural vital force 
and the relational categories of the understanding together yield a useful set of principles through 
which we can explore these animalistic aspects of ourselves. Notice, too, that this account of human 
nature appears to fare better than Arendt’s in that her account is much more conservative because it 
makes biological life a pillar for ‘labour’ (as contrasted with Kant’s account of animality).xix These 
advantages are consistent with holding onto Arendt’s central insight that our animality has its own 
distinctive value, and to realise this value—being in tune with our animalistic being in self-reflexive 
ways—is constitutive of realising a harmonious self. If we lose this connection, then we risk 
becoming ungrounded (alienated)—too reflective—which puts us at a distance from happiness and 
wisdom. 
Relatedly, notice how Kant’s multifaceted account of evil captures how, insofar as we (as 
individuals or as societies) have lost our way very seriously, we are likely to set irrational ends in the 
name of setting rational ones. Consistent with Arendt’s writings on totalitarianism, Kant combines 
his idea of a depraved heart with the vices that can be grafted onto the predisposition to humanity in 
order to identify ‘diabolical vices,’ vices that capture the worst we humans can do (Kant, 1996b, p. 75 
[6: 27]). Kant describes such diabolical destructive violence as rooted in an ‘anxious endeavor’ to 
obtain a ‘hateful superiority’ over others (Kant, 1996b, p. 75 [6: 27]), since they attach to the 
predisposition to humanity (end-setting and a social sense of self). Such wrongdoing is characterised 
by an ‘extreme degree of malignancy [, namely] … a maximum of evil that surpasses humanity… e.g. 
in envy, ingratitude, joy in others’ misfortune, etc.’ (Kant, 1996b, p. 75 [6: 27]).xx These evils ‘surpass’ 
humanity in that they are not fully comprehensible by, as Arendt also says, common sense, rational 
self-interest, or humanly comprehensible motives. It appears constitutive of the worst of human evil 
to make others suffer as such or to create conditions of what we may call ‘living death’ (Arendt, 
1948/73, pp. vii–ix).xxi Depraved violence attacks all of our embodied, social, rational being and aims 
to reduce us to focus all our agency on acting as if we were non-agents, to take away all of our 
spontaneity and to make us suffer to such an extent that lethal danger or suicide can present 
themselves subjectively as ways out. In this way, Kant’s account of the depraved heart is useful not 
only to capture totalitarianism but all profound political evil (what Kant calls ‘barbarism’). Moreover, 
in my view, Kant provides a philosophical account that can explain, as Arendt claims but doesn’t 
ultimately provide a theory of, why totalitarianism attacks truthful descriptions of reality itself 
(Arendt, 1948/73, p. 9): a depraved heart is necessarily self-deceived, which is why a depraved heart 
always seeks destruction under the guise of being construction. Notice too that this account is 
consistent with Arendt’s philosophical claim that insofar as modernity is characterised by a devaluing 
of our animality, fascist and totalitarian movements are more likely because our modern ability to 
feel our vulnerable, earthly animalistic being as valuable and harmonious is deeply flawed. This is 




In addition—and still in the mode of merely sketching the outlines of the fuller account—
since a Kantian account can draw on the distinct analyses in all three critiques together with his 
writings on human nature, it can avoid a single-lens analysis of various kinds of objects. Not only 
does this make it relatively easy to draw distinctions between objects of labour and objects of work, 
but the overall account gives us philosophical resources with which to capture a wide array of 
objects, such as metaphysical objects, scientific objects, biological objects, teleological objects 
(tools), aesthetic objects, and so on. Finally, notice that the combination of Kant’s account of virtue 
and of right yields much more systematicity with which to capture some (but not other) aspects of 
action than does Arendt’s account. That is to say, Arendt’s account is particularly good at capturing 
how good politics is an activity that requires outstanding people who can motivate others, speak 
together respectfully as equals on difficult topics, and succeed in creating a viable community. Kant’s 
writings are not distinctively good at capturing these political aspects of our public lives, but they are 
extremely good at capturing more formal aspects of public reasoning. For example, his writings 
capture really well how being a good public leader is not only about being a good politician in 
Arendt’s sense, but must also be able to use public principles of reason—principles of freedom—
against a background of wisdom, both of which in turn benefit from learning practical philosophy. 
Kant’s account can therefore agree with Arendt’s that the legal-political sphere (and its public 
reasoning) is not the same as the private (ethical) one, but his offers both distinctive principles of 
freedom suitable for each sphere (of right and of virtue). Together with Arendt’s strengths regarding 
politics in terms of action, we are in a position where we can develop a truly powerful analysis of the 
public legal-political sphere. 
The relative strength of Arendt’s regarding politics is also related to a more general point of 
comparison. Despite all his philosophical brilliance, Kant’s writings are not as wise, brave and good 
as Arendt’s on central aspects of human life. Hence, in my view, Kant’s general proposal regarding 
exactly how to accommodate human nature ( ‘moral anthropology’ (Kant 1996a, p. 372 [6: 217]) 
within his ideal theory of right, and how to apply his ideal theory of right to historical societies by 
means of what he elsewhere calls ‘the principle of politics’ (Kant 1996a, p. 614 [8: 429]), have crucial 
lessons to learn from Arendt as well as from other thinkers who broke with the norms of academia 
and academic philosophical writings. At the same time, however, and contrary to many scholars 
today, these thinkers could also have learnt a lot from Kant’s writings on freedom. That is to say, 
Arendt’s writings contain particularly deep analyses of the human tendency to evil from her 
perspective of entering academia as a ‘pariah’ (outcast) and having experienced the anti-Semitism of 
pre-World War II Germany and some aspects of European colonialism. Arendt’s texts are not wise, 
however, in relation to, for example, women, (Black) racism,xxii or LGBTQIA issuesxxiii. Moreover, if 
we want to read wiser political writings in these regards, written closer to Kant’s own time with a 
distinctive philosophical voice, we do much better by turning to Mary Wollstonecraft, Ottobah 
Cugoano, Sojourner Truth, Frederick Douglass, Anna J. Cooper, W.E.B. Du Bois, or Lydia Maria 
Child, to mention just a few. Then again, some of these texts have distinctly racist (Wollstonecraft), 
sexist (Du Bois), heterosexist (most of them), etc. elements of a similar kind to those we find in 
Arendt (rather than Kant). Below I suggest that we can see these troubles as revealing some of 
Kant’s general insights regarding the challenges of seeking wisdom as well as the ways in which his 
failures at achieving wisdom instantiated some of these problems—why doing practical philosophy 
is insufficient for wisdom as well as why wise people need practical philosophy. We also see one 
reason why some applications of Kant’s philosophy and much Kantian theory go seriously wrong 
either by engaging in active dehumanisation of historically vulnerable social groups by means of 
philosophy or by a morally disturbing silence around issues of oppression and violence. 
  
TOWARDS WISER PHILOSOPHICAL EDUCATION AND THEORIES? 
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If we look back at the practice of Western philosophy at universities in relation to our shared, 
human project of pursuing the highest good, some facts are striking. First, Western philosophy has 
provided conditions under which some truly brilliant, revolutionising philosophical systems and 
theories have been developed—with Kant’s accomplishments, including his ideal theory of freedom, 
among the highlights. Second, the writings of these philosophers, including Kant, on human 
phenomena such as race, sex, gender, religion and culture are typically distinctly bad and, by any 
stretch of the imagination, unwise. They fail, in other words, to realise the effects of the 
predisposition to evil operating in their arguments. Third, for millennia, like most institutions on the 
planet—legal-political, religious, cultural, educational—universities remained a space only for a few, 
relatively privileged men. Fourth, the truly courageous and wise persons who moved our societies 
forward towards a more humane, free and diverse world through initiating or leading political, 
literary, cultural, religious movements were typically not academically trained philosophers or their 
students. Fifth, philosophy is today among the slowest academic disciplines to diversify—and it still 
does so with enormous resistance from those in power. As hinted above, I believe that Kant’s 
account of human wisdom paradoxically helps us capture why the philosophical practice we are 
inheriting is bad in complex ways and why moving forward requires us to proceed differently than 
Kant himself did and more like Arendt in relation to so-called ‘applied’ or ‘non-ideal’ philosophy. In 
other words, as we move from our objective (ideal) theories of freedom to the human condition and 
historical societies, we need to switch from a top-down to a bottom-up method: from top-down 
application of pure principles to a recognition that the complexity of human life should be a starting 
point for some parts of more complete practical philosophical theories. Doing philosophy only from 
the bottom-up, however, is typically also insufficient to arrive at wisdom. Let me try to briefly 
explain and illustrate this point. 
  Alongside the growth of modern Western philosophy in universities as a site for privileged 
white men, there were some extraordinary philosophical minds striving to change the world for the 
better through literature, political writings and activism, as well as through creating alternative 
venues for pursuing their philosophical interests. It is impossible to do justice to all of them here, so 
let me mention just a few extraordinary persons and institutions as this is sufficient for our 
purposes. Queen Christina of Sweden (herself, according to most accounts, a member of the 
LGBT+ community), abdicated to pursue her philosophical interests in Rome, where she founded 
The Arcadia Academy in 1690 and insofar as her powers permitted, generally protected and 
promoted art, literature, philosophy, and tolerance (including for Jewish people). The 1600s also saw 
women like Margaret Cavendish and Anne Conway, who used their considerable social power and 
connections to break the ranks and write straightforwardly philosophical works—a tradition that 
was taken up by, for example, Mary Wollstonecraft and Mary Shepherd in subsequent centuries. 
From the 1700s onwards, women also started to organise salons—with three of the most 
philosophically famous ones hosted by Émilie du Châtelet, Sophie de Grouchy, and Rahel 
Varnhagen. These institutions also broke with existing social norms by creating intellectual spaces 
that were open, in varying degrees, to artists, writers, and intellectuals who were, for example, non-
aristocrats, non-Christians, or members of the LGBT+ community. The 1700s also saw the 
powerful, distinctly philosophical writing of Ottobah Cugoano on the horrors of European 
colonialisation and the Transatlantic slave trade. And in these centuries, we find women like Mary 
Ann Evans, who wrote deeply philosophical novels such as Middlemarch. 
In North America, we find that many of the philosophical minds who were denied access to 
universities—and, in some cases, any education at all—became deeply involved in political activism, 
typically combined with literary and political writings. For example, we find the profound 
philosophical thinking of, as mentioned above, Sojourner Truth, the Grimke sisters, Frederick 
Douglass, Anna J. Cooper, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Lydia Maria Child. Among the great 
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resources these thinkers left for us are philosophical reflections contained in journalist political 
writings, political speeches, literary writings, and autobiographies. As the various political 
movements gained success, women, people of colour, Jewish people, non-Christians more generally, 
and openly LGBTQIA+ people gained access to universities, and it didn’t take long before new 
kinds of works began to appear in philosophy together with very philosophical works written in 
other disciplines. For example, we began to see deep, systematic, and distinctly philosophical works 
on class relations (with Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels as the two pioneers), on the sub-conscious 
(pioneered by Sigmund Freud), on sexuality and gender (pioneered by Simone de Beauvoir), on 
totalitarianism and anti-Semitism (pioneered by Hannah Arendt), on intersectionality involving Black 
women (pioneered by Anna Julia Cooper), and on Black racism (pioneered by W.E.B. Du Bois). 
When we contrast all these ‘bottom-up’ writings with the ‘top-down’ writings of Kant and 
(until very recently) Kantians on issues regarding sex, race and gender, one is struck by the 
extraordinary difference in terms of careful attention to, engagement with, and vulnerability and 
wisdom around human oppression and suffering. This is not to say that these earlier, bottom-up 
critiques do not have blind spots and reveal prejudices—as mentioned above, they all do—but these 
shortcomings are at a different level than Kant’s. Kant characteristically lacks vulnerability and 
careful engagement with the social identities he writes about and judges; often he even develops 
theories (of race, of gender, of sex) to support his prejudices rather than first getting to know the 
lives or aspects of life his prejudices track. Indeed, it seems plausible that it was often his own fears 
that drove what he said when he applied his theories to any issue involving sexuality and gender; 
knowing his own heart in these regards appears to have been much too difficult emotionally for 
him.xxiv 
Most Kantians in the last few decades have abandoned Kant’s views on women, on gay life, 
and on race. However, this abandonment has often been combined with not saying anything at all 
about these issues or about non-ideal theory generally—a practice that Charles Mills (2012, 2017) 
has so usefully called the ‘whitewashing’ of the philosophical tradition. Others have instead kept 
Kant’s ‘us-them’ way of formulating questions and answers, such as ‘what shall we (representing the 
normative standard—heterosexual) think of gay sex (them)?’ Finally, until recently, most Kantians 
(like much ideal theory) have tended to portray the above philosophical thinkers as not being worth 
listening to, as not having something distinct and interesting to contribute to mainstream 
philosophy. Instead, the tradition of applying the objective principles of freedom from the 
philosopher’s armchair is common and presented as something all Kantians can do quite easily. My 
suggestion, then, is that when trying to think about these questions—including critiques of human 
phenomena such as sexuality, economic relations, race, gender, religion, etc.—we must stay truthful 
philosophically to the fact that these investigations are contingent and consequently must, in 
important ways, proceed from the bottom-up, including as we also seek abstract principles and 
ideas.xxv If we don’t, we will continue the practice of developing brilliant, but unwise philosophical 
theories.xxvi 
Historically, as mentioned above, after more social groups were admitted to universities, 
non-ideal theories became much more complex in terms of systematicity. At the same time, 
however, theorists often overreached what their theories can show. For example, it is implausible to 
use Marx to analyse all aspects of our lives, from sexual violence to gender identity to arrogance to 
education to awe to stunning aesthetic beauty, while our practical philosophies must indeed cover all 
these spheres. It is also impossible to use Marx to, say, give a legal argument regarding bodily 
integrity that explains the difference between degrees of heinousness in different kinds of sexual 
assaults, which our legal philosophies must strive to do. If we try to say something about where we 
should take it from here—as individuals, as cultures, as legal-political societies—Marx has very little 
to offer. The best philosophical theories, in other words, need both elements: ideal theory as well as 
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non-ideal theory that captures both the human condition generally (‘moral anthropology’) as well as 
particular lives and historical circumstances (the ‘principle of politics’). Which is not to say that we 
cannot do one part at a time, or that we cannot use elements of each to analyse a particular human 
phenomenon more thoroughly.xxvii Rather, it is to say that doing a part well requires awareness that 
one is doing exactly that part and not the whole. Finally, human freedom is only possible if we let 
the principles of freedom set the framework within which we pursue happiness as individuals and as 
societies. After all, if moral theories of freedom—like the ones we find in Kant—hadn’t already 
started to take a hold on public culture and been so good at identifying what counts as justifiable 
public, legal and political (i.e. reason-based) arguments, it is unlikely that radical movements outside 
of academia would have succeeded either. The push towards freedom needed to come from both 
sides—the objective and the contingent; top-down and bottom-up—and moving forward, our aim 
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i See Varden, 2020 on why Kant’s heterosexism is best viewed as a homophobia that is difficult to explain unless we 
attribute to him deep discomfort around his own sexuality. 
ii My way is obviously not the only way to read these two thinkers, but it is one that takes seriously what they encourage 
us to do with their writings, namely to use them to think for ourselves. For example, see Arendt’s related comments in 
‘Remarks’ that ‘each time you write something and you send it out to the world and it becomes public, obviously 
everybody is free to do with it what he pleases, and this is as it should be… You should not try to control whatever may 




(p. 476), and Kant encouragement: ‘Sapere aude! [Dare to be wise!] Have courage to use your own understanding 
[“Verstand”]” (WE 8: 35) in “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’, in Practical Philosophy. Moreover, this 
approach enables us to see ways in which the writings of Arendt and Kant can be combined to address topics that the 
philosophical resources of either one of them alone cannot do. 
iii For a fuller discussion of each of labour, work, and action, see “Part III. Labor,” “Part IV. Work,” and “Part V. 
Action” of (Arendt, 1958/98). 
iv This is of course not to say that all sexual or erotic pleasure aims at orgasms. For more on these topics, see Varden 
(2020a). 
v For another discussion of this difference, see Plato’s on sexual pleasures in Gorgias.  
vi Varden (2020a) presents another interpretation of the sage, namely as a moral ideal that we admire when we see it 
instantiated, such as in the Dalai Lama, but it would be a mistake to infer from this that the sage is the human ideal we 
should all strive to realise. For discussion on this point, see the interchange between Janelle DeWitt and myself in SGIR 
Review. [Provide a reference for this and add to the reference list.] 
vii This is not to say that being truthful is sufficient for having moral integrity. Rather truthfulness, on this approach, is a 
precondition (necessary) for moral integrity. 
viii Here I have rendered the text gender neutral to make it more consistent with the original, which uses the male noun 
(er) because the noun for human being (der Mensch) is a male noun in German. 
ix See Katerina Deligiorgi (2020) for more on Kant’s idea that striving to deserve to be happy makes rational sense even 
if we actually deserve to be morally happy but are not. 
x See Varden, 2020a.  
xi For Kant’s account of the predisposition to good in human nature, see (Kant, 1996b, pp. 74-76 [6: 26–29]); for my 
interpretation and elaboration on these ideas, see Varden, 2020a, b. 
xii  ‘Self-reflexive’ consciousness means an awareness internal to any thought or action, whereas ‘self-reflective’ 
consciousness means a first-personal thinking about what one is thinking or doing and that one is the one doing it. Self-
reflective consciousness is a second-order awareness of what I am already self-reflexively conscious of. 
xiii See Callahan and Allais, 2020 for a recent collection of articles on Kant on animals. 
xiv I believe Varden, 2020a is the first Kant interpretation that pays careful attention to this aspect of Kant’s (and 
Kantian) practical theory. 
xv For my basic take on these positions, as well as how they relate to debates in metaphysics and metaethics, see Varden, 
2020a. For the contrast between Janelle DeWitt’s more cognitive approach and my own, see our discussion regarding 
Sex, Love, and Gender forthcoming in SGIR Proceedings. 
xvi For more on my take on Kant on animals, see Varden, 2020c. 
xvii For more on my interpretation of Kant’s on these points, including on his distinction between perfect and imperfect 
duties, see Varden (2020a). 
xviii See Kant, 1996b (pp. 76–89) [6: 28–45)]) for his account of the propensity to evil in human nature, and Varden, 
2020a for a fuller interpretation of his account. For an alternative approach, according to which self-deception is more 
pervasive in all evil, and an overview of much of the related, secondary literature, see Papish, 2018. 
xix This, in my view, is central to why I could develop a Kantian account of sex, love, and gender that can overcome the 
mistakes and shortcomings of Kant’s own position in Varden (2020a). It would be much more difficult to do the same 
within Arendt’s philosophical framework. 
xx Notice, though, that we are here talking about diabolical actions, not a diabolical will (which, we saw above, we don’t 
have). 
xxi For more on Arendt and Kant on political evil, see Varden (2021). 
xxii For more on this, see Belle, 2014. 
xxiii For one illustration of this, see the “Zur Person” interview here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dsoImQfVsO4&t=890s 
xxiv For more on this, see Varden 2020a. 
xxv This is one way in which I believe we can take on Onora O’Neill’s important challenge that Kantians (and others) 
must strive to “abstract” and not “idealize” (understood as universalizing their own or other contingent ways of living 
life). See, for example, O’Neill (1996). 
xxvi One unfortunate effect of this tends to be that Kantians and their critics do not engage with each other’s works in 
productive, philosophically open-minded ways. For our purposes here, I set aside these controversies and instead focus 
on the Kant scholarship. For an overview over the entrance of women into Kant scholarship, see Varden, 2020a; for 
overviews over many of the historical, critical feminist engagements with Kantian thought and productive Kantian 
responses, see also Herta Nagl-Docekal, forthcoming. 
xxvii I view Varden, 2020a to be doing the latter, to provide a more complete critique of sex, love, and gender. 
